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society's, is to improve or change the initial sentencing mechanism so
its sentences are adequate.
The individual's right to appeal is most effectively protected by
imposing a ceiling on resentencing which would eliminate an undesir-
able aspect of retrial-the threat of greater punishment.43 The Court
in Pearce unfortunately chose not to protect absolutely the defendant's
right to appeal.
W. Stokes Harris, Jr.
CoNsTTuToNAL LAw-FEEDOm oF ExpssmoN-Symmormc Fam
SPExcH.-On June 6, 1966, a Brooklyn patrolman approached a crowd
of people standing around a black man burning a flag. The man,
Sidney Street, was telling them, "If they let that happen to Meredith,
we don't need an American flag." Street explained to the officer that
upon hearing the news that James Meredith had been shot, he set
fire to his flag. The policeman arrested Street and charged him with
"publicly mutilating the United States flag."' A New York court
convicted him of malicious mischief and gave him a suspended
sentence. The New York Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed.
2
The Supreme Court of the United States noted jurisdiction.3 Held:
Reversed. It was possible that Street might have been convicted
not only for physically mutilating the flag, but also for defying it
with words, such words being constitutionally protected. Since the
New York statute did not separate the words from the act, the Supreme
Court declared the statute unconstitutional. Chief Justice Warren,
43 This ceiling could easily be imposed by statute. Indeed, Justice Black deems
this to be a legislative problem. 395 U.S. at 738. In most states, the permissibil-
ity of harsher resentencing of successful appellants is strictly a judicial creation
without statutory support. Two states, California and Virginia, forbid harsher
resentencing as does the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 10 U.S.C. § 863 (b)
(1964). The American Bar Associations Project on Minimum Standards for
Criminal Justice has a draft which reads:
Where prosecution is initiated or resumed against a defendant who has
successfully sought post conviction relief and a conviction is obtained,
or where a sentence has been set aside as the result of a successful ap-
plication for post conviction relief and the defendant is to be resentenced,
the sentencing court should not be empowered to impose a more severe
penalty than that originally imposed. ABA STANDARDs BELATING TO POST
CoNVIrcION REMMIES 96 (1967).
1"Any person who... shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile or defy, trample
on, or cast contempt upon either by word or act [any flag] shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor." N.Y. PENAL LAWS § 1425(16) (b) (McKinney 1944).
In 1967, this statute was superceded by § 126 of the N.Y. GENERAL BusINEss
LAw which defines the crime in similar language.
2 People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 229 N.E.2d 187, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1967).
8 Street v. City of New York, 392 U.S. 923 (1968).
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in a dissenting opinion, noted that the Court failed to answer the
crucial issue in the case; namely, whether flag-burning should be
allowed as symbolic free speech. Street v. City of New York, 394
U.S. 576 (1969).
The free speech or free expression clause of the first amendment
has an emotional, though relatively uniform history of interpretation.
In the well known case of Schenk v. United States,4 the Supreme
Court set the fundamental base for free expression cases:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
dangers that Congress has a right to prevent.5 [Emphasis added].
Other than the "clear and present danger test," the Supreme Court
has since devised more limitations on free expression. These include
"derisive, fighting words,"6 obscenity,7 libel,8 and the "advocacy of
overthrow of government by force." To some extent, these curbs are
modifications of the clear and present danger test, but to a much
larger extent, the decision of whether to allow a certain form of
expression rests on a balancing of interests. The conflicting interests
in such cases are public safety and the "search for truth."'1 Thus
expression is not free, but tempered by its content and sometimes
by the reaction which that content generates. 1 Another ramification
4249 U.S. 47 (1919).
5 Id. at 52.
6 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
7 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).8 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
9 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 859 (1931).10Z. CHAFEE, FnnE SPEEH IN TH= UN=SED STATES 31 (1954); Note, 18
CLEv.-MAn. L. REv. 407 (1969).
Cases which have applied the balancing test include Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250 (1952); American Communications Comm'n v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382 (1950); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Similar
standards for allowing or forbidding certain modes of expression have been held
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Cf. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1942); Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
See generally D. Alfange, Draft Card Burning, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 1 (1968);
T. Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 975 (1968).
Excellent short student writings may be found in 1969 UTAH L. REv. 118 (1969);
20 MERCER L. REv. 505 (1969); 20 SYR. L. REv. 773 (1969). See also T.
EmERsON, ToWARM A GENERAL THEoRY OF E FrST AmmrD~mr= (1907);
M. FRNxuN, DNAivncs oF AmmcAN LAw (1968); A. WEsn, FRm
Now (1964).
"Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). See generally 16 Am. Jua. 2d
Constitutional Law § 348, 672 (1964).
All ideas having even the 'slightest redeeming social importance'-un-
orthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing
climate of opinion, have the full protection of the constitutional guaran-
(Continued on next page)
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of the problem, more nearly related to the facts of the Street case,
is the question of what happens when the protected speech is ac-
companied by an act. Courts have allowed freedom to the words, but
have distinguished the act.'
2
Sometimes, however, one need not use words to "speak" Courts
have fabricated fictions of "symbolic speech," which now include
among others: raising a red flag,13 refusing to salute the flag,14
sit-ins,' 5 picketing,16 draft-card burning,17 and hanging offensive ma-
terial from a clothesline.' 8 Such "symbolic speaking" is given pro-
tection, although encompassing as it does action, it is more closely
scrutinized and less likely to be allowed. 19
The Court's opinion in the present case implies that flag-burning
is clearly criminal, with no advertence to whether it is symbolic
speech. The majority said there is a legitimate state interest in
preventing the burning of flags, without explaining what that interest
is. It is true that every state has an anti-flag desecration statute,20
and that the House of Representatives has recently passed a similar
bill.2 ' Warren's dissent, on the other hand, clearly spelled out the
issue which the court refused to face, and Justice Black to some
extent agreed with him. The issue as Black saw it was that the
conviction rested on flag-burning alone, while only Warren asked
whether it should be protected as symbolic speech.22
It seems that the issue which the Chief Justice has named is the
proper one, although one could disagree with his answer to it. It
appears that had the proper issue been examined under the tests
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
tees, unless they encroach upon the limited areas of most important
interests. Indeed, advocacy of conduct proscribed by law is not a
justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of
incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be
immediately acted on. Id.
12United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U. S. 296 (1940); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). As is vividly
exemplified in the present case, courts will carefully examine the incriminating
statutes to be certain that the speech is not forbidden along with the act.
13 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 859 (1931).
14West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. (1943).
15 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).16 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
17 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
18 People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963).1 9 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Draft card burning is
symbolic speech, but is punishable because of the "legitimate" government interest
in maintaining an orderly system of conscription.20 Note, Desecration of National Symbols as Political Expression, 66 MCEc L.
REv. 1040 (1967).21 Hearings on H.R. 271 Before the Subcom. No. 4 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14 (1967).
22 Street v. City of New York, 894 U.S. 576, 591 (1969).
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previously enumerated, i.e. the "clear and present danger" test of
Schenk, the balancing of interests test of Beauharnais, Cantwell, and
Chaplinsky,23 or the "time, place and manner of expression" test of
Cox v. New Hampshire,24 and, had the Court carefully considered
the brilliantly written opinion of Justice Jackson in the celebrated
"flag-salute" case of West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,25 flag-burning would have been recognized as symbolic
speech and as such, permitted under every test.
The evidence indicates that there was neither violence nor threat
of it that summer day in Brooklyn. The onlookers stood by peace-
fully. Street did not resist arrest. In Edwards v. South Carolina,26
the Court specifically noted that fact in allowing peaceful picketing
as "speech." Thus the test of "clear and present danger" appears
inapplicable, although the New York Court of Appeals quite
blatantly and erroneously characterized Street's act as:
• . . an act of incitement, literally and figuratively 'incendiary'
and as fraught with danger to the public peace as if he had stood
on the street comer shouting epithets at passing pedestrians.27
This characterization of the facts seems open to severe criticism.
A black man, aggrieved by the oppressive system which denies him
equality, finds words inadequate to express his disgust at the political
system which shrugs at assassination of those who advocate peaceful
attainment of that equality, the Merediths, Kings and Kennedys.
He, a veteran, takes his own flag, lays it on the street and burns it,
solemnly declaring his rejection of the society represented by the
smoldering flag at his feet. What more symbolic, eloquent, yet
peaceful expression of dissent can there be?
Let us proceed with the Court's own tests. Let us balance the
interests. Public safety against the search for truth, "law'n'order"
versus protest, free expression versus respect for the flag. Why make
flag-burning a crime at all? What legitimate state interest is pro-
tected by preventing the burning of a flag? The flag is nothing if
not a symbol.
Symbolism is a primitive, but effective way of communicating
ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system...
is a short cut from mind to mind. Causes and nations ... seek to
knit the loyalty of their following to a flag or banner .... Symbols
23 See note 10, supra, and accompanying text.
24312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941).
25319 U.S. 624 (1943).
26372 U.S. 229 (1963).
27 People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d at 237, 229 N.E.2d at 193, 282 N.Y.S.2d at491 (1007).
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of state convey political ideas. . . . A person gets from a symbol
the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man's comfort and
inspiration is another's jest and scorn. . . . Here it is the state
that employs a flag as a symbol of adherence to government as
presently organized.
28
These exerpts from Justice Jackson's opinion in Barnette underscore
the point that the flag or the preservation of it is not so sacrosanct
an interest as to justify denying a constitutionally protected liberty.
There is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or of
the nature and origin of its authority.... Authority here is to be
controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by authority....
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion.
29
Hence, if one differs with the prevailing authority and tries to
form a following to create an opinion against that authority, he may
speak without fear.30 If one wishes to effectively express rejection
of the entire system, what better way to do it than to reject its
symbol-the flag. As Justice Douglas in his dissent in Adderly v.
Florida1 noted, mere talk, petitions through regular "channels" and
other "usuar' means of voicing dissent are so futile that other tactics
are needed. Justice Black, in his dissent in Beauharnais,32 strongly
urged that political protest, because of its valuable content, never be
wholly excluded. The peaceful burning of a flag certainly voices an
effective political protest.
If the State seeks to elicit patriotism by compulsory adherence to
a symbol and to punish those who refuse, it will find that,
Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find them-
selves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion
achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. 33
Nestor L. Olesnyckyj
CoNsTrunoNAL LAw-FRST AmENDMENT FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PREss-FEDERAL COMMUNICATEON COMMISSION's FAurNEss DocrnuE
AND PimsoNAL ATTACK RuLE.-On November 27, 1964, Red Lion
Broadcasting Company [hereinafter Red Lion] carried on its Pennsyl-
28 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1943).
29 Id. at 641-42.30 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 264-65 (1952).
31385 U.S. 39, 49-51 (1966).
32 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
33 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
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